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Infringers or Innovators? Examining
Copyright Liability for Cloud-Based
Music Locker Services
ABSTRACT
Music lockers-Internet sites where users may store a copy of
their music for later playback-have revolutionized the way people
listen to music, allowing them to take their music with them anywhere
in the world. However, rights holders are concerned that these locker
services potentially infringe music copyrights when they allow their
users to upload and stream music and when they use a space-saving
technology called "deduplication." This Note delineates the separate
rights guaranteed under the Copyright Act as applicable to music
lockers: the right to copy and the right of public performance. The
analysis looks at several music locker services to determine if they are
directly or secondarily liable for copyright infringement, and, if they
are, whether the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Safe
Harbor could ultimately prevent judgment against them. Although a
court may find locker services secondarily liable for infringement, the
DMCA may still provide a safe harbor. Furthermore, this Note argues
that Congress should update and clarify the Copyright Act to legalize
the use of deduplication and to better define the DMCA's public
performance right.
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Internet music lockers have revolutionized the way people
listen to music. These services allow their users to upload their music
to the services' Internet servers in order to listen to it from anywhere
in the world.' While a user may think that a company that uses this
business model is climbing a stairway to heaven, it is actually on the
highway to hell. License holders who own the rights to the music the
cloud service users have uploaded can now sue these music services
for millions of dollars under theories of direct and secondary copyright
infringement. Grooveshark, 2 iTunes, 3 and Google Music 4 are all music
locker services located on the Internet, or "cloud," where users may
upload their music collections to the cloud and then access that music
at any time from any Internet-connected device.5 Because courts have
not yet fully resolved whether these new services may be liable for
copyright infringement, 6 these companies have attempted to use
1. See, e.g., iTunes in the Cloud, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/icloud/features (last
visited Jan. 26, 2012).
2. Grooveshark for iPhone, GROOVESHARK, http://mobile.grooveshark.com/phones/
iphone (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
3. iTunes in the Cloud, supra note 1.
4. About Google Music, GOOGLE, http://music.google.comlabout (last visited Jan. 24,
2012).
See sources cited supra notes 2-4.
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different technical methods of uploading, storing, and streaming their
users' music in order to limit potential liability.7
This Note analyzes the liability of music locker services under
existing copyright law. The analysis will address two main issues:
how the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) applies to music
lockers, and how Congress could amend the DMCA to achieve its dual
objectives of protecting copyright owners while simultaneously
fostering innovation and efficiency. Users' personal liability is beyond
the scope of this Note.
Cloud-based music locker services represent a new and
evolving form of media consumption, one that Congress could not have
fully comprehended when, in 1998, it added the DMCA to the 1976
Copyright Act. Because legislators cannot write laws that place
specific regulations on unforeseen future technologies, courts must
analogize to older forms of technology such as VCRs, eight-track
players, and cable television.
Part I of this Note explains the business models of various
music locker services and provides background information on their
services, the separate rights guaranteed to rights holders under the
Copyright Act, and background information on the DMCA and its safe
harbor provision. Part II analyzes the music locker services for direct
and secondary liability. Finally, this Note concludes by identifying
several points of law for Congress to clarify in the DMCA: specifically,
affirming that music locker services may use deduplication technology
and explaining who does the performing when a user streams a
musical work from an online music locker.
I. SETTING THE STAGE-LOCKER SERVICES, THE DMCA, AND THE
RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
Several features differentiate the locker services, the most
salient of which are the use of deduplication and the existence of
licensing from copyright holders. In order to analyze liability for these
music locker services, this Part will delineate the separate rights
guaranteed to the copyright holder by the DMCA, which include the
right to copy and the right to public performance.
A. Music Locker Services
This Note will analyze several different services, including
Apple, Spotify, Google, Amazon, Dropbox, Grooveshark, and
MP3tunes. There are several distinguishing features among these
7. See infra Part I.A.
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locker services. The largest factor is licensing; other factors include
the use of deduplication (the automatic elimination of redundant data
on a server), music-sharing capabilities for users, and streaming
options.8
Spotify, which has recently entered the US market from
Europe,9 has established a licensing scheme with the four major US
music labels: Sony Music Entertainment, EMI Group, Warner Music
Group, and Universal Music Group.10 Spotify allows all users to listen
to its licensed library of songs for free, and allows paying customers to
stream music to their mobile devices.11
Apple's iTunes Match service is similar to Spotify's in that it
also has licensing agreements with the four major music labels.12
iTunes Match works by scanning users' music libraries and then
giving users access to iTunes songs that correspond with those on
their computers, regardless of whether the user purchased them
legitimately or pirated them.13 If a song is not already stored on
Apple's servers, the server uploads and stores it as the master copy for
future users to access. 14 Users only receive access to the songs that
they have uploaded, unlike with other services that grant access to
any song that exists on the server.'5
Grooveshark only has a licensing deal with EMI, which
resulted after EMI sued it for copyright infringement; however,
Grooveshark stores any music that its users upload. 16 Users are able
to listen to any song on Grooveshark for free and paying users can
8. See infra text accompanying notes 9-21.
9. Jason Ankeny, Spotify Goes Live in the U.S. After Clinching Warner Music Deal,
FIERCE MOBILE CONTENT (July 14, 2011, 7:57 AM), http://www.fiercemobilecontent.com/story/
spotify-goes-live-us-after-clinching-warner-music-deal/2011-07-14.
10. Id.
11. What Can Spotify Do?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/features (last
visited Feb. 6, 2012).
12. Chris Foresman, Why iTunes Match Has Indie Soul Label Singing the Blues, ARS
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2011/06/why-itunes-match-has-indie-soul-label-
singing-the-blues.ars (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
13. iTunes in the Cloud, supra note 1 (explaining how iTunes match works). The
concern with this system is that a user could pirate thousands of songs and then use iTunes
Match to gain access to legitimate copies of his music. See infra Part II.A.
14. iTunes in the Cloud, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. Jon Healey, Looking for Napster 2.0, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-healeyl5octl5,0,1679894.story; Eliot Van Buskirk,
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stream music to their mobile devices, including music that others have
uploaded. 17
Dropbox and MP3tunes both use a new technology called
"deduplication" in their storage of user-uploaded media.' 8
Deduplication is a technical process that analyzes new data to be
stored on a server and compares it to information that is already
stored there.19 The server catalogues and eliminates any redundant
data, thus saving valuable storage space, bandwidth, and costs. 20
When a user uploads his music library to MP3tunes, its servers only
upload the songs that are not already on the server, simultaneously
retaining a unique copy of each song for the user while eliminating
redundant data on the server.21
B. Rights Granted by the DMCA
The Copyright Act guarantees copyright holders an exclusive
and specific bundle of rights. 22 These rights include the right to copy
and the right to public performance. 23 Because courts may find
liability for a breach of any one of these rights, this Note delineates
between the different Copyright Act rights that music locker services
implicate. The right to copy becomes relevant when a user uploads a
song to a music locker's servers, and the right of public performance
stems from the streaming of the song back to the user.
1. The Right to Copy
First in the list of rights delineated in the US Copyright Act is
the copyright holder's exclusive privilege to reproduce his works. 24
17. Grooveshark for iPhone, supra note 2; Terms of Service, GROOVESHARK,
http://www.grooveshark.com/terms (last updated Jan. 9, 2012).
18. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 93351, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011); Ed Silverstein, FTC Gets Complaint on Dropbor
Related to Deduplication, TMCNET.COM (May 17, 2011), http://www.tmcnet.com/topics/articles/
175730-ftc-gets-complaint-dropbox-related-deduplication.htm.
19. Data Deduplication (Intelligent Compression or Single-Instance Storage),
SEARCHSTORAGE, http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition/data-deduplication (last updated
Sept. 2008) [hereinafter Data Deduplication].
20. Id.
21. MP3tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *50.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); see Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision
II), 536 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2008), (applying the rights to copy and public performance to
television shows stored on a remote server), vacating in part, rev'g in part Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision 1), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106; Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 126.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
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The Act defines copies as "material objects .. . in which a work is fixed
by any method ... and from which the work can be ... reproduced." 25
The work must be stored for longer than a "transitory duration."26
The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied this
definition in the 2008 case Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.
(Cablevision II), where defendant Cablevision, a cable television
service provider, implemented a recording system that allowed users
to record television shows that Cablevision transmitted to them. 27
The court specifically looked to Cablevision's copyright liability, not
the liability of its subscribers. 28 When Cartoon Network aired a
television program, it would stream that program to Cablevision,
which would in turn transmit the program to the customer. 29 If the
customer chose to record the program, Cablevision's system would
record the show as Cartoon Network transmitted it, maintaining a
unique, individual copy on its own servers for each customer who
recorded the program. 30 If a customer did not choose to record the
program, Cablevision did not maintain any copy of the program for
that customer. 31
The two issues were whether Cablevision's temporary copy or
its permanent storage of the cable video stream were each a "copy"
under the DMCA.32 The court found that the buffered stream, which
Cablevision saved for 1.2 seconds, existed only for a transitory
duration and thus was not legally a copy; however, the more
permanent recording that remained on Cablevision's servers was a
copy. 33 Additionally, a separate court recognized that there was no
question that when a user copies a work onto an Internet Service
Provider's (ISP) servers, he makes a copy for DMCA purposes.34
2. The Right of Transmission and Public Performance
The second right guaranteed to copyright holders is the right to
transfer, or perform, a work to the public.35 This right contains three
25. Id. § 101.
26. Id. (defining "fixed" under the Copyright Act).
27. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124, 127.
28. Id. at 140.
29. Id. 536 F.3d at 124.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 124-25.
32. Id. at 127.
33. Id. at 129-30.
34. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing
NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1995)).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006).
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parts: (1) the work that is being performed, 36 (2) the audience of the
performance, 37 and (3) the transfer or performance of the work. 38
Courts disagree on whether performing a single copy of a work to
multiple people or performing a single copy, unique to each user who
receives it, of a given work may violate the public performance right.39
It is settled, however, that the work at issue is the original work that
was created,40 and the performance of that work is the act of
transmission to the public.41 Thus, for this Note, the transmission of a
performance is the streaming of a song, which is the original work, to
a service's subscriber.
Applying this test in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd
Horne, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a
single copy of a work, performed to the public, constituted a public
performance in the case of a video rental store. 42 Redd Horne operated
a video rental store where customers could rent and privately view
videos in Redd Horne's in-store viewing booths. 43 Because many
customers were able to watch a single copy of a videocassette
individually, the store's actions triggered the public performance
right. 44 The court relied heavily on the fact that Redd Horne played
the same copy of a videocassette for each of its customers who viewed
it.45
Extending the Third Circuit's ruling, the Second Circuit in
Cablevision II held that the use of distinct copies of television
programs for each subscriber was essential to defeating a claim of
infringement of the public performance right.46 That court found that
36. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 135.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101; Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134-35.
38. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134-35.
39. Compare id. (holding that a system that maintains a unique copy of a television
show for each user, and only accessible by that user, does not violate the public performance
right), with Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 93351, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (suggesting that a system that employs a "master"
or single copy of a work that is accessible to many users may violate the public performance
right).
40. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 136 (holding that the transmission of a performance
to the public refers to the performance that is created "by the act of transmission"). Plaintiffs
unsuccessfully argued that the transmission referred to the "original performance" or work,
which would imply that the potential audience for any transmission not only encompasses those
currently receiving the transmission, but any potential audience who may receive a transmission
of the underlying work. Id.
41. Id.
42. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 156-57.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 159.
46. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2008).
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the use of a unique copy for each viewer was significant because it
limited the number of people who might view each transmission, a
relevant factor in determining whether Cablevision made a
transmission to the public.47
The second part of the test to determine if a party has violated
the public performance right looks to the audience of the
performance. 48  The Copyright Act defines performing a work
"publicly" as either performing the work at a place "open to the
public," or transmitting a performance of the work "to the public ...
whether the members of the public capable of receiving" the
transmission receive it at separate times or places. 49 The Cablevision
II court noted that defining who constitutes the "universe of people
capable of receiving" the transmission of the performance, rather than
those who actually receive the transmission of the performance, is
essential in order to determine liability in this context.50
In determining the size of Cablevision's viewing audience, the
court cited the legislative history surrounding the most recent
overhaul of the Act in 1976.51 The 1976 House Report states that
courts should consider a transmission "public" even if none of the
"potential recipients was operating his receiving apparatus at the time
of the transmission. The same principles apply whenever the potential
recipients of the transmission represent a limited segment of the
public, such as ... the subscribers of a cable television service."52
Additionally, the court cited a 1967 House Report that had addressed
this same issue, noting that the transmission clause would be
implicated when the transmission is "capable of being performed or
displayed at the initiative of individual members of the public."5 3 This
analysis leaves room for non-public transmissions. 54
It is important to clarify the difference between the
transmission of a "work"-the transmission of the original creation,
which does not violate an author's rights under the Act-and the
transmission of a "performance"-any transmission of a particular
copy of a work, which may lead to liability for infringement.55  The
47. Id. at 138.
48. Id. at 134.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
50. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134, 137.
51. Id. at 135 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64-65 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678).
52. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64-65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5678).
53. Id. (emphasis added) (citing H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 29 (1967)).
54. Id. 536 F.3d at 136.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 135-36.
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district court in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision
Systems Corp. (Cablevision 1) had concluded that a transmission of the
same television program to members of the public would constitute a
public performance, regardless of whether Cablevision maintained
individual copies of the program for each user.5 6 The problem with
such an approach is that the potential audience for a work is the
public in general.57 Under this court's analysis, any transmission of
any work could implicate the public performance clause because
anyone else could potentially receive a transmission of the work, even
though he may not be able to receive the same transmission as other
audience members.58
On appeal, the plaintiffs in Cablevision II asked the court to
interpret the transmission clause as implicating any transmission of
the original performance to the public. 59 The court of appeals rejected
this argument, noting the unworkable result: if a customer were to
transfer a song from a compact disc he owns to his computer, he would
be liable under the public performance clause "simply because some
other party had once transmitted the same underlying performance to
the public."6 0 Congress surely did not intend such "odd results," the
court posited. 61
The crux of the analysis in Cablevision II is that a court must
examine specifically who is "capable of receiving" the transmission of a
performance. 62 Appellate courts seem to be in agreement that if an
ISP transmits to only one subscriber, using a copy of the work that
subscriber made himself, then the only person capable of receiving the
transmission is that individual subscriber. 63 The right of reproduction
bolsters protection for copyright holders because, although a rights
holder may not be able to recover damages for a non-public
transmission, he may be able to recover for the copying that preceded
the transmission. 64
56. Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated in part by, rev'd
in part sub nom. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121.
57. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 135-36.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 136.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 135.
63. Id. at 137; see Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP),
2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006); Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 138.
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C. The DMCA- A Modern Addition to the Copyright Act
Congress adopted the DMCA in 1998 in response to growing
concerns over digital piracy.65 Copyright holders believed the 1976
Act was insufficient to protect their interests because it did not
contemplate copyright protection in a modern digital world, and
therefore they lobbied Congress to implement the DMCA. 66 Generally,
the DMCA heightens liability for copyright infringement, but it also
provides a safe harbor for ISPs who comply with certain provisions.67
The DMCA applies to ISPs, defined broadly as "a provider of
online services," including any service that provides "digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of
material of the user's choosing."68 Cloud-based music locker services
meet this definition because they exist to allow users to transfer
communications (music) between or among points (the user's
computer and the ISP's server) of the user's choosing.69 The use of ISP
in this Note-technically defined as any service provider on the
Internet-should not be confused with the colloquial definition of ISP
(a company that provides Internet access, such as Comcast).70
The safe harbors built into the DMCA include offsetting the
penalties for direct copyright infringement.71 Congress designed the
safe harbors to give immunity to those ISPs that are "innocent,"72 and
the US Supreme Court has stated that courts should construe these
safe harbors narrowly. 73  As a threshold matter, an ISP must
implement a repeat infringer policy in order to qualify for safe harbor
immunity.7 4 Essentially, the requirement creates a strong incentive
for ISPs to make some reasonable effort to prevent repeat infringers
from abusing their services.75
65. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The
Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 279 (2001).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k); ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th
Cir. 2001) (finding that a provider of access to online newsgroups is a service provider under the
DMCA).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k); see also ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 623.
70. See Internet Service Provider, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/internet+service+provider (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
72. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 93351, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (quoting ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625).
73. Id. (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
75. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 655 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
see also Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100-01 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(holding that Congress designed § 512(i) to prevent websites from receiving immunity from
738 [Vol. 14:3:729
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Courts have identified three threshold requirements that a
service provider must comply with in order to be eligible for one of the
DMCA's safe harborS7 6: (1) an ISP must implement some system for
receiving and executing takedown notices," (2) it must not interfere
with the copyright holder's right to submit takedown notices,78 and (3)
the service must block access to those users who are repeated
infringers.79 However, in order to identify repeat infringers, the ISP
does not have a duty to actively police and investigate its users;
instead, the responsibility rests on the rights holder.80
Assuming that a locker service satisfies the threshold
requirements, the safe harbor provision most applicable to online
locker services is found in § 512(c), which addresses files that a user
stored on an ISP's servers.81 To become eligible for the safe harbor,
the service (1) must not have actual knowledge of infringing material
or activity,8 2 (2) must not be aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent,83 (3) must work quickly to
remove infringing material upon notice of its existence,84 and (4) must
not receive a financial benefit directly resulting from the infringing
activity.85
Included in the awareness requirement is the "red flag"
knowledge doctrine.86 Under this doctrine, an ISP may not assert a
safe harbor defense if it is aware of certain red flags, such as a user
linking to a website with a title containing words like "pirate" or
"bootleg."87 However, courts have held that a "general awareness" of
liability if they allow users to violate copyright); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213
F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i); MP3tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *19-20; see also
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2007).
77. MP3tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *19-20.
78. Id. at *20.
79. CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1109-10 (finding that a service provider did not meet the § 512(i)
standard because it intentionally encrypted user information, and thereby prevented any
enforcement of its anti-infringement policy).
80. Id. at 1111.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); MP3tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *24.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
83. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
84. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C).
85. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
86. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
87. See S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, S.
REP. No. 105-190, at 40-44 (1998).
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infringement on an ISP's service is insufficient to constitute either
actual or red flag knowledge.""
D. Deduplication
Another issue linked to the right to copy is the technology of
deduplication, which, as mentioned above, is a method of eliminating
redundant data in order to reduce storage and bandwidth costs. 8 9 For
example, a server could back up one copy of a one-megabyte email
attachment sent to one hundred people rather than an individual copy
for each person, thus reducing storage requirements by orders of
magnitude.90  Additionally, deduplication systems use a related
technology called "hashing" that assigns each unique file a "hash tag"
(or "digital fingerprint") based on the contents of the file.91 If a user
tries to upload a song to a music locker's servers and the server
determines that the song has an identical hash tag as a song that is
already on the server, then the server does not upload the duplicate
copy, but instead grants the user access to the file that already existed
on the server.92
Deduplication, which merely eliminates redundant data, is
distinct from maintaining a master copy of a song that is accessible to
any of an ISP's users. Apple uses licensed master copies in its iTunes
Match service.93 When a user tries to upload a song, the server
recognizes that individual song, and rather than uploading a new copy
of it, the server gives that user access to the master copy: the server's
existing copy of that song.94 The resulting reduction of bandwidth and
storage costs provides a strong economic incentive for implementing
this system.95
Courts are still split on whether unlicensed deduplication
results in an illegal master copy or whether it is in itself illegal. 96 The
88. See Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523-25 (holding that although YouTube might have
a general awareness of the proclivity of its users to upload infringing content, finding YouTube
liable without actual knowledge would "contravene the structure and operation of the DMCA").
89. Data Deduplication, supra note 19; see also supra notes 18-20 and accompanying
text.
90. Data Deduplication, supra note 19.
91. See Ralph C. Losey, Hash: The New Bates Stamp, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2007)
(providing an example hash tag as "162B6274FFEE2E5BD96403E772125A35").
92. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 93351, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011); Data Deduplication, supra note 19.
93. Timothy Lee, Are Google Music and Amazon Cloud Player Illegal?, WIRED (July 9,
2011, 9:30 AM) http://www.wired.comlepicenter/2011/07/google-amazon-illegallall/l; see also
supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
94. See Lee supra, note 93; see also notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
95. See Data Deduplication, supra note 19.
96. See infra notes 97-102.
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Cablevision II court found that because Cablevision kept an individual
copy of the shows for each user, there could not a performance to the
"public" because the shows were available only to that user and not for
the general public to view.97 However, the court explicitly limited the
holding to that narrow scenario.98 Because the court declined to
extend its holding to any other form of media,99 it avoided a more
general ruling to guide liability determinations in future deduplication
cases.100 The court in Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, on the
other hand, came down squarely in favor of allowing unlicensed
deduplication, noting that MP3tunes removed "redundant digital
data" and did not keep a master copy of any of EMI's songs on its
servers.10 1  The court highlighted this distinction as important,
suggesting that MP3tunes may have been liable if it had used a
master copy.102
Because the legality of deduplication itself is still up in the air,
it is unclear whether it might constitute infringement in the context of
music lockers. The Cablevision II decision implied that anything but a
distinct, individual copy for each user could constitute a transmission
to the public, because the public at large could potentially view a
single copy open to multiple viewers. 103 The MP3tunes court, however,
ruled that a locker service may still maintain, through deduplication,
what amounts to an exact digital copy of each user's files without
violating the public performance right.104 This rule, however,
contravenes the Red Horne ruling, where the video store maintained
an exact copy of each client's video, albeit embodied in one
videocassette. 105
The difficulty arises when trying to delineate what constitutes
a performance of a song that, through deduplication, represents
unique copies for each user that has uploaded it. Does the single copy
embodied on the server still represent a unique file for each user who
97. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008).
98. Id. at 139-40.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 138-39.
101. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 93351, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011).
102. See id.
103. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 138.
104. See MP3tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *50-51.
105. Compare id. (holding that the elimination of redundant data does not constitute
infringement on a copyright owner's public performance right in the absence of a master-copy
system), with Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that a store violated a copyright owner's public performance right by allowing its
customers to watch a single master copy of a videocassette individually).
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has uploaded it, as the Cablevision II court would find?106 Or is it no
less infringing than a single videocassette that any number of users
may play?107
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR MUSIC LOCKER SITES UNDER THE
DMCA
This Part analyzes whether the various music locker sites
described in Part I should face either direct or secondary liability for
copyright infringement. First, this Note analyzes direct liability for
the music locker services under both the copy and public performance
right, concluding that courts should not hold the services directly
liable for copying because they fail the volitional act test. However,
there is no easy answer under existing law with respect to the public
performance right.108 Furthermore, there are potential DMCA safe
harbor defenses that music locker services could assert against direct
liability claims.
Additionally, ISPs may potentially face secondary liability
under three different theories: inducement of infringement,
contributory infringement, and vicarious infringement. After a careful
analysis, a court might conclude that the services face liability under
the theories of inducement and vicarious infringement.
A. Direct Liability
This Section begins by analyzing the history of direct copyright
liability from its original two-prong test, Congress' addition and
codification of a volitional requirement test, and finally its present
interpretation in DMCA case law.109 Following that, this Note will
apply the DMCA case law to the several features of digital cloud
lockers.
1. History of Direct Liability under the Right to Copy
Historically, courts have found that a claim of direct
infringement had two requirements: (1) the plaintiffs alleged
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) unauthorized copying or a
106. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 137-38.
107. See, e.g., Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159 (holding that because many of a store's
customers were able to watch a single copy of a videocassette individually, the playing of the
videos was a "public performance").
108. See infra Part III (discussing potential solutions to this issue).
109. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
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violation of one of the other "bundle of rights" granted to copyright
holders. 110 Several older cases shed light on the historical contours of
direct liability for copying.
The court in Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic
Distributors, Inc. found that a plaintiff record company had
established a likelihood of success on the merits in a direct
infringement action against a store owner for allowing customers to
use its eight-track tape"' copy machine to reproduce copyrighted
tapes from the store's library when customers purchased blank
tapes.112  Although store employees did not load tapes into the
machine or perform the actual copying, the court found the store
directly liable because the store clearly profited from the
infringement.113
Furthermore, in Princeton University Press v. Michigan
Document Services, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
found a copy shop liable for copying textbooks for professors without
seeking permission from the rights holders or paying any royalties. 114
The court noted that the copy shop was actually making the copies,
even though it was the customer who initiated the transaction." 5
Another case, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc., better delineated the contours of the
direct liability doctrine when applied to ISPs.116 In Netcom, the issue
was whether an ISP that provided Internet access and an online
bulletin board service (BBS) was liable for direct infringement when
serving as a "passive conduit" for copyright infringers.117 BBS users
posted copies of the plaintiffs copyrighted photographs online, albeit
without any volitional action on behalf of the service."18 The court
decided it would be unfair to hold the ISPs directly liable for the
affirmative actions of a third party when the ISPs had not performed
110. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 621 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Keeler Brass Co. v. Cont'l Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir. 1988)).
111. An eight-track cassette is an older version of a tape cassette. Vintage Audio History,
VIDEO INTERCHANGE, http://www.videointerchange.com/audio-history.htm (last updated Dec. 9,
2011).
112. See Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 824-25
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
113. See id. at 823.
114. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th
Cir. 1996).
115. See id. at 1388-89.
116. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1368-73 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
117. See id. at 1365-66.
118. Id.
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those actions themselves.1i 9 Furthermore, the court realized that such
a system would result in finding essentially the entire Internet liable
for the infringing acts of one user.120
Congress subsequently adopted Netcom's volitional act test and
incorporated it into the DMCA.121 The House Report accompanying
the DMCA states that "the bill essentially codifies the result in the
leading and most thoughtful judicial decision to date: Religious
Technology Center [v]. Netcom On-Line Communications Services,
Inc."l22 In the new law, Congress clearly states that ISPs are not
directly liable in cases where an infringer uses an automated system
that the ISP has implemented. 123 Essentially, if there is no volitional
conduct on the part of an ISP, there is no direct liability. 124 Courts
have repeatedly applied this test when analyzing direct infringement
liability for ISPs.125 Although copyright holders may claim that
requiring volitional conduct on the part of ISPs will never result in
liability when it is the ISP's users who are infringing copyrights,
courts are quick to note that plaintiffs may still pursue a remedy
under theories of contributory liability. 126
Courts have applied the DMCA's volitional act test in recent
cases as well. 127 In Cablevision II, the volitional conduct doctrine was
the key to determining precisely who made the infringing copy of a
cable show. 128  The court recognized two distinct volitional acts:
Cablevision's creation and maintenance of a system designed solely to
make copies, and the customer who uses that system to create a
specific copy. 129 The system is similar to a VCR in that an ISP created
it knowing its reproduction capabilities, and a user took advantage of
those capabilities on his own volition.130 Because the ISP is not itself
actively copying, it should not be held directly liable for a customer's
infringing activities. 131
119. Id. at 1372-73.
120. Id. at 1372.
121. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)-(5) (2006).
125. See, e.g., Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2008).
126. See, e.g., id.




131. Id. at 132.
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2. Direct Liability for Infringement of the Right to Copy
Because a music locker service does not copy files itself,132 it
does not commit the volitional act required for direct infringement
liability. Therefore, a court should not find it directly liable. To
succeed in a claim of direct liability, a copyright holder must show (1)
a valid copyright, and (2) that the service violated that right.133
Assuming that a rights holder has a valid copyright to a song, the
analysis moves to the second prong: whether or not the ISP directly
violated the right to copy. This section also assumes that the music
locker service does not maintain a license agreement with the rights
holder for the music its users upload.
There is no question that when a user uploads a song to an
ISP's servers, a copy is made. 134 Under the DMCA, the copy here is a
"material object[]" which is "fixed" on the ISP's servers, and "from
which the work can be . . . reproduced."135 The issue is who made the
copy.136 If a music locker service does not use deduplication, when a
user uploads a song, the server makes a copy of the song from the
user's computer and stores that copy on the locker's server. 137 The
user directs the upload, taking advantage of the service's ability to
make a copy for his individual locker. This is similar to Cablevision II,
where a user could employ a remote control to make an individual
copy of a streaming television show on Cablevision's servers.138 The
end result is that the ISP becomes a "passive conduit" that a user may
direct to make legal or infringing copies. 139 Because the service is
merely an automatic tool, the ISP does not take any affirmative action
in the user's copying, and thus should not be directly liable for his
actions. 140
132. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011
U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (explaining that MP3tunes' subscribers
directed the server's passive software to make copies, MP3tunes did not direct the copying).
133. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 621 (4th Cir. 2001).
134. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing
NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1995)).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "copies" of a work).
136. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 130.
137. See, e.g., About Google Music, supra note 4 (explaining how a user may upload and
store his music on Google's servers).
138. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124-25.
139. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
140. See id.
745
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
3. Direct Liability under the Public Performance Right
Since no court has addressed the public performance right
under the theory of direct liability, it is difficult to predict whether or
not a court might find direct liability for public performance in the
music locker context. 141 This section analyzes the liability of locker
services under the difference technical models that they employ. This
analysis resolves two interrelated questions in particular: (1) is there
a public performance, and if so, then (2) who is performing, the locker
service or the user? The two parts to public performance analysis are
that the court must consider both the work that is performed and the
audience receiving the performance.142  If there is no public
performance by either party, there can be no direct liability for the
locker service.143 Furthermore, if the ISP does not itself perform to the
public, then a court cannot hold it directly liable because it fails the
DMCA's volitional requirement test. 144
a. There is no Public Performance When a Locker Service does not Use
Deduplication.
A court should not find that a public performance exists when a
music locker service maintains individual copies of each user's uploads
and only allows each user to access his own music. The ISPs that
utilize this technical model are Google, Apple, and Amazon. 145
Because these services maintain an individual copy of each song that
each user uploads and do not use deduplication, every time a user
streams his music from one of these servers, the work that is
"performed" to him is the same file that he already uploaded.146
Essentially, the work is the individual copy of that user's song. Thus,
this method likely fails the first part of the public performance test
because the work is only capable of being performed to one person, not
the public. This is functionally identical to Cablevision II, where the
court held that it was essential for the ISP to maintain individual
copies of each user's recorded television shows in order to defeat the
public performance infringement claim.147  Furthermore, the court
141. See infra Part III (suggesting a solution to this issue).
142. See supra Part I.B.2.
143. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 139-40.
144. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370.
145. See Lee, supra note 93.
146. See About Google Music, supra note 4 (explaining how a user may upload his music
to Google's servers and stream it to any place in the world).
147. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 138-39.
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held that the individual copies were significant to the resolution of the
second prong: Who is the audience that receives the performance?148
When the work performed is only available to a single user of a
music locker service, a transmission of the work is not considered a
public performance because it is performed to an audience of one.149
The Cablevision II court correctly interpreted "the public" from
Congress's definition of "publicly" as the class of people to whom the
work is capable of being performed.150 Because these locker services
maintain an individual copy of each song for each user, that user is
the only available "universe of people capable of receiving" a
performance. 15 1 Thus, there is no public performance and no direct
liability under the public performance right for Google, Amazon, or
Apple. Since there is no public performance, there is no need to
consider who might constitute the performer.152
b. It Is Unclear Whether There Is a Public Performance When a Locker
Service Uses Deduplication.
It is less clear whether there would be direct liability under the
public performance right for Dropbox or MP3tunes due to the use of
deduplication on their servers. 153  Again, the analysis turns on
whether there is a public performance involved in such a system, and
if so, who does the performing?
Using the Cablevision II framework, one must begin by
specifying the work being performed: Is the work a master copy, or is
it a user's individual, unique copy of that master copy? There is no
clear answer to this question because courts have disagreed on this
point. 15 4  The Second and Third Circuits have concluded that
deduplication results in a master copy of a performance. 155 If that is
true, then under a deduplication system, the performance a music
locker service transmits to one user is the same as the performance it
transmits to another user, even if each user individually uploads his
copy. However, a court following the reasoning of a US district court's
recent decision in MP3tunes would find that deduplication does not
148. Id. at 138.
149. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "publicly").
150. Id.; Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134.
151. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 137; Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07
Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011).
152. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134.
153. Recall that deduplication is a technical measure implemented to reduce storage
costs by eliminating redundant data. See supra Part I.D.
154. See supra Part I.D.
155. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 130, 138-39; Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd
Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 156-59 (3d Cir. 1984).
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result in a master copy; instead, it is merely an economically efficient
method of reducing data duplication and costly storage hardware. 156
Under this framework, the server retains an exact digital copy of each
uploaded song, and thus each user still receives the exact music that
he uploads rather than an infringing reproduction of the original
file.157 The MP3tunes framework is more persuasive, and courts
should follow its precedent because it allows for music locker services
to increase efficiency and does not prevent rights holders from
legitimately enforcing their rights.
4. Who Creates the Public Performance?
The next part of the analysis under Cablevision 11's framework
looks to the makeup of the performance audience. 168 Under the
Second and Third Circuits' framework-where deduplication results in
a master copy-the storage of one song on a locker's servers results in
a performance transferrable to an infinite number of persons (albeit
restricted to the users who upload the song).159 Thus, the server may
transmit the song to the public, creating a public performance.
Consequently the second question, the identity of the performer,
comes into play in order to determine liability.
In contrast, under the MP3tunes framework-where
deduplication does not result in a master copy-a court may not find
that a public performance exists because the deduplication process
still allows the server to maintain a perfect copy of each user's
upload.160 The case becomes analogous to Cablevision II, with each
performance accessible to only one individual user. 161 Thus, because
the performance cannot be transmitted to the public, there is no public
performance.
Even if a court finds that deduplication does not result in a
single master copy, it could still determine that a public performance
took place. If the court were to find that the identical parts of a
performance that were deduplicated on an ISP's server constituted a
performance, then transfer of that piece of data to separate users
could constitute public performance. A court would then analyze the
second part of the test for liability: Who does the performing?
Current case law does not dictate whether a court should
consider the music locker or its users as performers for purposes of
156. MP3tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *50.
157. Id.
158. See supra Part I.B.
159. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 138-39; Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 156-59.
160. See MP3tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *50.
161. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 126.
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direct liability claims. 162 The Cablevision II court sidestepped this
issue, as it found that no public performance had occurred in the first
place. 163 It did note that although the customer-not Cablevision-did
the copying, that did not imply that the customer performed the
work.164 The MP3tunes court also avoided the issue by finding that
MP3tunes.com was eligible for a DMCA safe-harbor defense.165
If a court were to transplant the volitional act test that courts
use to analyze direct infringement of the right to copy into this
context, 166 it would find that it is the customer-not the ISP-who
transmits the performance, because the customer commits the
volitional act of copying. The ISP's role is passive, as it simply lets the
user make a copy on its server.
B. Secondary Liability
Secondary liability is arguably more important to rights
holders than direct liability, because where it may be difficult for a
court to find direct liability, the court may find secondary liability
relatively easily.167 This section analyzes the separate theories of
secondary liability under which a court may find an ISP liable for
copyright infringement: inducement of infringement, contributory
infringement, and vicarious infringement.
1. Inducement of Copyright Infringement
The inducement doctrine stems from the Supreme Court's 2005
decision in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.168 The defendant,
Grokster, promoted and distributed a computer program that enabled
users to download copyrighted material illegally online.169 It intended
its users to download copyrighted material, even advertising and
promoting its service as such. 170 For a plaintiff to succeed with an
infringement claim under this theory, he must show that the
defendant "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
162. See infra notes 163-165.
163. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134 (declining to rule on which party transmits the
performance).
164. Id.
165. MP3tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 93351, at *50-51.
166. See infra Part III.
167. See, e.g., Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 132 (holding that the court's refusal to find
direct liability is "buttressed by the existence and contours of ... contributory liability").
168. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939-41 (2005).
169. Id. at 919-23.
170. Id. at 916.
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steps taken to foster infringement."171 The Court set the bar even
higher by stating that if an ISP has actual knowledge of its users'
infringing activities, that knowledge alone does not give rise to a claim
of inducement. 172 Ultimately, the issue turns on whether the ISP
actively and purposefully engages in conduct that induces copyright
infringement."13
The court in Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc. analyzed
the actions of the Grokster defendant, and found four factors that
illustrated the defendant's inducement of infringement.174 First was
the defendant's aim to fill the market niche left by the shutdown of the
file-sharing program, Napster.175 Second, the court noted that the
defendants failed to implement any filtering tools or other software to
protect against infringement. 176  Third, the defendant's business
model depended on infringement. 77 Finally, the court noted the
"classic" form of inducement: advertising that provokes others to
infringe.7 8
Analyzing the factors presented and examined in Grokster and
Arista Records, it is unlikely a court would find a music locker service
liable for copyright infringement under the inducement theory. Three
of the four Grokster factors weigh in favor of the locker services.179
First, none of the locker services aim to fill a void left by some
infringing service, nor do they exist but for copyright infringement. 180
Given that several lockers have licensing agreements with music
labels,18 it is plain that the purpose of these services is to provide
legitimate music purchasers an outlet to store and stream their music
libraries.182
The second factor does weigh against the locker services, as
they do not maintain active filters against infringing activity on their
servers; however, they all comply with the DMCA
171. Id. at 919.
172. Id. at 936-37.
173. Id.





179. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 (2005).
180. Id.; see supra Part I (explaining that Grooveshark exists to allow its users to store
their music and thus be able to listen to it anywhere unlike file-sharing websites, which hold
themselves out as locations to pirate copyrighted music).
181. Spotify, Apple, and Grooveshark all have licensing deals. See supra Part I.A.
182. See, e.g., Foresman, supra note 12 (explaining Apple's licensing scheme with the
major US music labels).
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notice-and-takedown provision. 18 3  Because the lockers comply with
the DMCA requirement, a court may not give this factor much weight.
Third, the services do not depend on piracy in order to be
profitable. One could argue that Grooveshark-which makes all songs
users have uploaded to its server publicly available-could benefit
from piracy, because it would increase the number of songs it could
make available through user uploads. 184 However, it is difficult to
argue that Grooveshark exists because of and in furtherance of music
piracy; its service is readily distinguishable from that of Grokster or
other file-sharing websites.' 85
The fourth point, actual inducement, weighs in favor of the
lockers. 186 None of the locker services advertise to infringers, nor do
any of their websites even suggest the possibility of using their
services for piracy. Therefore, it is unlikely that a court would find
the locker services secondarily liable based on inducement.
2. Contributory Copyright Infringement
There are two parts to the test for contributory copyright
infringement: (1) whether the ISP has actual or constructive
knowledge of infringing activity, and (2) whether it "induces, causes,
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."187
Although the requirements for contributory infringement are similar
to those for inducement of infringement, the Supreme Court appears
to have made them separate issues.188
Courts have applied several different standards to determine
whether an ISP knows about infringing activity. This knowledge may
be actual or constructive; if the ISP has "reason to know" 89 of
infringement, that will be sufficient for establishing contributory
liability under the "[t]urning a 'blind eye"' standard.o90 The MP3tunes
court found that the ISP in that case had knowledge of its users'
183. See supra Part I.
184. See supra Part I.
185. Compare supra Part I (explaining Grooveshark's service which profits by selling
streaming access to a user's music locker), with Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 2d 124, 131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining how USENET enables a user to pay to have
access to hundreds of thousands of files, and markets that service as an "alternative to
peer-to-peer file sharing programs").
186. See Arista Records, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 151.
187. Id. at 154 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
188. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
189. Arista Records, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001)).
190. Id. (citing In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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infringing activities based on the takedown notices it received from
EMI as well as personal knowledge of its own users' infringements. 191
The second prong of the contributory infringement test is
whether the ISP has materially contributed to the direct infringement
of its users. 192 The provider's contribution to the infringing activity
must be "substantial";193 for example, supplying the "site and
facilities" or "environment and market" for the infringement. 194
Two cases illustrate the "material contribution" standard.
First, in Arista Records, the court found that the defendant provided
the entire "site and facilities" to enable its users to directly infringe
copyrights by supplying a website and service where a user could
search for copyrighted songs and other media and then download
them for free onto his own computer.196 The court rejected the
defendant's argument, based on Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., that there was a defense to contributory liability for
a product that is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses."196 In the
second case, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the court found that
the ISP established everything its users would need in order to find
and download music illegally. 197 The court noted that Napster's users
would not be able to pirate the music they wanted without Napster's
service.198 The In re Aimster district court opinion, in applying
Napster, drew a distinction between innocent ISPs that people might
use for infringement and ISPs like Napster or Aimster without which
a user would be unable to find and download copyrighted music. 199
It is possible for a court to find contributory liability for music
locker services under the two-part test. A rights holder could probably
show that the locker services have knowledge of infringing activity.
The second prong-material contribution-would be harder to prove;
however, it is still probable that a court would find that a music locker
service meets the standard for material contribution. 200
191. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 93351, at *45-46 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011).
192. In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.
193. Arista Records, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
194. Id. (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 155-56 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 442 (1984)).
197. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Although courts have criticized this case, the material contribution standard lives on. E.g., In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 652 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
198. A&M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
199. In re Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
200. See generally Arista Records, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (applying the material
contribution test).
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A court is likely to find that a music locker service has
knowledge of infringing activity under multiple theories. 201 First,
because the ISPs retain control over their services, they are able to see
which users are uploading which songs. 202 Thus, they could have
actual knowledge of infringing activity among their users.203 Second,
the ISPs are put on notice-and thus have actual knowledge-of their
users' infringements when rights holders send DMCA takedown
notices. 204 Finally, an ISP would have knowledge if it were to turn a
blind eye to infringement, though it does not appear this is
occurring.205
As to the second prong, a court is likely to find that the music
lockers materially contribute to copyright infringement. While the
locker services do not exhibit the same unclean hands that Napster 206
or Usenet 207 did by supplying copyrighted music for download, the
legal standard for material contribution may still lead to liability for
music locker services operating in good faith. Under the "site and
facilities" or "environment and market" test, a court would likely find
that a music locker service provides the necessary function and
equipment for a user to infringe on a copyright, because these services
allow the user to upload music that he illegally obtained elsewhere
and then stream that music to himself.208 The locker service's
contribution is substantial, and the copyright infringement (uploading
a copyrighted song to the locker's servers) could not have taken place
but for the existence of the facilities of the ISP.209 Thus, the locker
service satisfies this prong of the contributory liability test.
201. See id. at 154-55 (holding that a plaintiff may show actual or constructive
knowledge, or that defendant ISP "turn[ed] a 'blind eye' to infringement").
202. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 93351, at *46 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (finding it "undisputed" that MP3tunes keeps
track of its users' infringing music files); see also In re Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (noting
that the owner of an ISP is able to see the people who use it and how they use it).
203. In re Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
204. See DMCA Complaint Form, GROOVESHARK, http://www.grooveshark.comldmea-
form (last visited Jan. 26, 2012); see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264
(9th Cir. 1996) (finding that there was no question that the defendant had knowledge when it
received letters from the police informing it of vendors selling infringing materials at its swap
meet).
205. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
206. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
207. See Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 132-33 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
208. See supra Part I.
209. Arista Records, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
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3. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
Vicarious copyright liability is based solely on the financial
benefit to the secondary infringer, regardless of the knowledge or
intent of that party.210 The first prong of the vicarious liability test
asks whether the ISP profited from direct infringement.21 1 In order to
constitute a direct financial benefit, the infringing activity must be a
"draw" to the service's users; however, the degree that this "draw"
contributes to the overall appeal of the service to its users is
irrelevant.212 Furthermore, the benefit to the service does not need to
be great or even substantial. The fact that a financial benefit exists at
all is sufficient. 213
The second prong of the vicarious liability test analyzes
whether the ISP declined to stop or limit the infringement. 2 14 This
analysis is based on an ISP's ability to control its users' actions,
including terminating and limiting access to users.215  In Arista
Records, the court found the defendant vicariously liable because,
although it was able to control its users by terminating their accounts,
it failed to do so. 2 16
A court will likely find that music locker services meet the first
requirement but not the second, and therefore vicarious liability
should not apply to these services. All of the locker services stand to
benefit from piracy because a user can upload a pirated song to any
locker and then stream it, which adds to the user base of the service
and consequently increases its revenue. Thus, plaintiffs should find it
easy to prove the first prong. Satisfying the second prong, however,
will be virtually impossible as long as locker services comply with
DMCA notice-and-takedown requests and implement a repeat
infringer policy. 217  Exercising such control over their users and
actively trying to prevent piracy should be sufficient to safeguard
them from vicarious liability.
210. Id. at 156.
211. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
212. Arista Records, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 157 ("The essential aspect of the 'direct financial
benefit' inquiry is whether there is a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any
financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a




216. Id. at 157-58.
217. See id.
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III. HOW TO AMEND THE COPYRIGHT ACT TO PROMOTE Music LOCKERS
There are many problems with the DMCA and its potential
application to music locker services; however, Congress could fix
several of them by amending the DMCA. This Part discusses two
amendments to the DMCA as solutions to these issues: allowance for
deduplication and clarification of the public performance right. This
update should help further the primary goal of the original Copyright
Act: to promote innovation while protecting rights holders.
A. Deduplication
The biggest issue that affects music locker services is whether
or not they are legally allowed to engage in deduplication, and current
case law has not satisfactorily resolved the issue. There are two
different methods for applying deduplication technology to eliminate
redundant data. Under the first method, an ISP makes a single
master copy available to multiple users who all have the right to that
individual file.218 The second method is a more technical measure that
runs on the music locker's servers, where the server analyzes the
individual bits of data from each file to determine if any strings of
data from that song are already on the server.219 If the song contains
bits of data that are already on the server, the server does not upload
any substantial repetition of data, but instead inserts a link to a
preexisting copy of that string of data.220 This second form is what the
MP3tunes court seemed to allow in its holding.221
As a practical matter, there is no reason to deem deduplication
illegal. There is no functional difference between two users uploading
identical songs, with each user listening to the copy that he uploads,
and the same two users listening to a master copy. However, under
current case law, the first scenario seems to be allowable, but the
second may constitute a public performance and thus result in
copyright infringement.222
The main rationale behind allowing music lockers to use
deduplication is economic efficiency. Apple's iTunes Match system
allows users to upload entire music libraries in mere minutes, while a
service like Google's or Amazon's may require weeks to upload an
218. See, e.g., Foresman, supra note 12; see also iTunes in the Cloud, supra note 1.
219. See supra Part II.
220. See supra Part II.
221. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2011 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 93351, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011).
222. See, e.g., Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121, 138 (2d Cir. 2008).
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entire library of music. 22 3 In addition to the time and bandwidth costs
of uploading and downloading the same song over and over, the
storage space that music locker services require would be reduced by
several orders of magnitude. Cloud-based lockers must exist in a
physical location, and contain many servers filled with hard drives.
Using deduplication would result in a massive reduction in the
number of hard drives needed, which results in lower costs for locker
services. The benefits grow exponentially when Congress applies this
same principle to all media-including videos-that users can store in
the cloud.
B. Clarifying the DMCA
Although Congress created the DMCA with new and innovative
technologies in mind, it needs to update the statute regularly to
ensure that the law covers technologies that have already arrived.
While it is generally within the purview of the courts to interpret
Congress's words, when the courts avoid an issue, Congress should
step in and clarify itself. Specifically, Congress should identify who is
performing and to whom the performance is made when a user
streams his music on a music locker's servers to himself.224
The best solution to this issue is to adopt the volitional act test
that courts already use to determine direct liability for copying. 225
Although this test itself is not new, no court has used it to analyze
public performance liability; a statutory solution should give the
courts better direction for resolving this issue. This test would allow
courts to easily determine who is performing the work-the person
who directs the locker's service to play back a stored copy. Under such
a theory, courts would not find music locker services directly liable
under the public performance right because these lockers lack the
volitional requirement; all that the services have done is implement
an independent system that their subscribers direct and use.
Furthermore, secondary liability will remain available to protect the
interests of copyright holders, while the DMCA safe harbors will allow
clean-hands music lockers to continue to function.226
223. See Mark Milian, Court Clears Cloud Music Providers to Expand Features, CNN
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-23/tech/cloud.music- 1arash-ferdowsi-google-s-
music-music-beta.
224. See supra Part I.D.
225. See supra Part II.A.
226. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 132.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If music locker services continue to operate as they are now
under the existing DMCA, it is likely that a court could find them
secondarily liable for copyright infringement. It is also possible that a
court could similarly find that locker services using deduplication are
directly liable. Although DMCA safe harbors are available in some
cases, and courts generally look to whether the service has clean
hands in determining liability, the existing case law suggests that
these innovators, who make no effort to advance infringement or
piracy, could still be liable for infringement.
Because of the uncertainty in the case law and the DMCA
today, Congress should update the DMCA to allow innovators to
develop new technologies without worrying about lawsuits when they
have done nothing wrong. As legislators update the DMCA to clarify
certain points of law, including the legality of deduplication, these
music locker services-and by extension, the public-will benefit from
both the enhanced certainty of the law and the increased economic
efficiency that deduplication will allow.
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